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Assent MCP: An Agent Asks, a Human Signs, Etch Never Holds the Key

An AI agent can now request a human signature over MCP and get back a verified signed PDF, and Etch never sees the key. Inclusion proofs are now bound to the content hash, so verification no longer depends on Etch's database. All 137,663 production records were backfilled.

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Three things shipped for Assent and Etch on the same day. Together they make "verify without trusting the vendor" true for one more step of the chain, and they put a human signature inside an agent's tool loop.

Assent MCP: Agents Request, Humans Sign

etch-assent-mcp is an MCP server with three tools:

  • >request_signature takes plain text, which it renders to a one-page sign-off PDF, or an existing PDF. It encrypts the document on the agent's machine, uploads only ciphertext, stamps the plaintext hash as event 0, and returns a sign_url for the agent to deliver.
  • >signature_status reads the public chain and reports sent, opened, signing, or finalized. It also flags a signer who was shown different bytes from the ones that were sent.
  • >fetch_signed downloads the signed copy, decrypts it locally, saves it only if its SHA-256 matches the chain's finalized hash, and then recomputes the inclusion proof itself.

The key exists only in the sign link and in a local file readable by the owner alone. Etch never holds it. The agent can act for its principal, and the commitment still needs a human.

pip install "etch[mcp] @ git+https://github.com/maco144/Etch"
claude mcp add etch-assent -- etch-assent-mcp

Proofs Bound to the Content Hash

Until now, an Etch receipt let you recompute the leaf hash and the Merkle root yourself. The link from that leaf back to *your document's* hash, though, rested on Etch's database: the hashed payload included a timestamp that was never stored.

Now every proof returns the exact payload that was hashed. Verification has four steps instead of two, and all four run offline:

  1. 1.Hash your document.
  2. 2.Check that the payload names that hash.
  3. 3.Hash the payload to get the leaf.
  4. 4.Walk the inclusion proof to the public root.

Old records weren't left behind. The missing timestamp was read microseconds before the stored creation time, so a backfill searched just below it until the payload hashed to the recorded value, which is an exact SHA-256 preimage. 137,663 of 137,663 production records recovered, with a median gap of 10 µs. Every receipt Etch has issued now verifies without trusting Etch.

Form Fields, Detected in the Browser

Assent now finds the fields in a PDF for you, without the document leaving your device:

  • >Fillable PDFs import their AcroForm text, checkbox, radio, and signature fields at the exact boxes, with existing values.
  • >Flat PDFs get suggestions from underscore blanks, drawn lines, ( ) and [ ] blanks, table cells, and bare labels like "Name:".
  • >Word checkboxes are recognized. Tested against a PDF exported by Word itself: 13 of 13 checkbox styles, with no false hits on prose like "2(a)".

Date blanks prefill with today's date, and name and email blanks follow the signer's identity panel.

Why It Matters

Agents will commit their principals to things. The record should survive the agent, the vendor, and the database. Now it does.

Try it at assent.to. The protocol lives at etch.locker.